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NOTES AND COMMENTS ON RECENT
DECISIONS.
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE.

Persons riding in Orivate vehicles, etc., at invitaion of owner.
The Suprenie Court of Montana in Whittaker*v. City of
Helena, 35 Pac. Rep. 9o4, has recently added itself to the few
courts which uphold the erroneous doctrine that a person who
is riding _in a private vehicle at the invitation of the owner
is chargeable with the contributory negligence of th6 latter.
This decision is not supported by any independent reasoning,.
but rests wholly on the authority of Pfideaux v. Mineral
.Point, 43 Wis. 513. That case argues the matter as follows:
"One voluntarily in a private conveyance voluntarily trusts.
his personal safety in the conveyance to the person in control
of it. Voluntary entrance -into a private conveyance adopts.
the conveyance, for the time being, as one's own, and assumes
the risk of the skill and care of the person guiding it. Pro hacvic, the master of a private yacht, or the driver of a private
carriage, is accepted as agent by every person voluntarily
committing himself to it."
This case, however, stands almost alone, and is opposed to
an overwhelming weight of authority, as was clearly shown by
an. annotation on this very subject in Vol. 32 of this MAGAZINE,
p. 763 ; and is moreovei- opposed to every principle of law and.
justice. One person cannot be held responsible for the acts
of another unless there is some relation between them that will
make those acts in legal effects the acts of the former. The
only relations that have this effect are those of principal and
agent, including master and servant, and that anonymous
relation, akin to conspiracy inicriminal law, which. exists
between those engaged in the prosecution of a-joint enterprise,.
and by which each, though equally a principal with the others
is also, to all' intents and purposes, the agent of each of them.
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It is manifest that this latter relation cannot exist between
the driver of the vehicle and the one who rides in it at his invitation. That point has never been seriously urged, and could
not well be, in face of the plain facts. Nor is it much more
reasonable to hold that the driver is the agent of the one
riding with him. In order to constitute the relation of principal and agent, there must be a right in the former to 'control
the latter. A free agent has no principal, And in cases like
the one in point it will hardly be contended that the passenger,
as we may call him, has any right to control the motions of
the driver. He may remonstrate, he may refuse to ride with
him, he may, in short, use any and all means of persuasion at
his command, or even use words of control, but the driver
is under no obligation to obey him, and it is this obligation to
obey that constitutes control in the legal sense.
There is no trust in the acceptance of an invitation to ride
that will exonerate another whose negligence contributes to
the injury. It is difficult to see what is meant by the word
trust in such a connection. Neither does the rider accept the
conveyance for the time being as his own, for this implies
control, and there can be no control from the very nature of
the case. It would be much more reasonable to hold that the"
hirer of a public hack or cab adopted that conveyance as his
own, and in fact the hirer in such case does exercise some
control, at least as to his destination. But in this latter case,
the mere fact of hiring, by the almost unanimous assent of the
authorities, does not make the driver the agent of the hirer;
and this doctrine has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of
the United States: Little v. Hackett, I i6 U. S. 366.
A fortiori, then, one who rides in a private conveyance on
invitation cannot in any sense of the word rhake the conveyance his own, or make the driver his agent. To quote the
language of a well-considered case, one on all fours with the
case under discussion, and in which the whole ground was
carefully reviewed, "N;here, as inthis case, the passenger has
no control over the driver, and does not own the vehicle, and
is without blame, and there is no ground in truth and reality
for holding him to be the principal or master, there is neither
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reason nor justice in holding him bound by the contributory
negligence of the driver:" R. R. v. Hogeland, 66 Md. I49.
There is the additional consideration that there has never been
an attempt to extend this doctrine to the case of direct negligence on the part of the driver. Yet a.mastef is responsible
for the negligence of the driver of his own carriage; and if the
driver is the agent of the invited passenger for contributory
negligence why not for all other purposes? "It is a poor rule
that won't work both ways," as" the author of the annotation
heretofore alluded to very justly remarks; and that maxim
applies with great force to the present case. Certainly, to
hold that the driver is an agent for one purpose, and not for
another, is inconsistent to a marked degree, and would seem
to betray a consciousness of the inherent weakness of the
former position.
The question, therefore, does not seeni to have had full
presentment or donsideration in the Montana Case; and it is
to be hoped that when it comes before the court again, if that
should happen, that the present decision will be overruled,and
a doctrine announced moire consonant with authority, with
reason and with justice.
The foregoing remarks apply only to the imputation of negligence as matter of law, resting on the relation between the
parties. The passenger may be negligent on his own part, by
riding with a driver known to be reckless or in a vehicle
known to be unsafe, by not keeping a proper lookout for
danger, or by encouraging the driver to expose them both to
risk. But these are wholly different considerations, and do
not apply to or affect the question of imp'utation.
ARDEMUS STEWART.
EQUITY CASES-

Tntstee ex-maliftciofollowing trustfunds.
An interesting opinion was handed down by the Supreme

Couit of the United States in January last in the case of
Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, etc., Ry: Co., reported in
151 U. S. I.
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Angle had contracted with what the opinion calls the Portgage Company to complete the construction of its road within
a time specified by the Legislature of Wisconsin as a condition upon which a certain land grant to the company
depended. He was pushing the work vigorously and apparently, would undoubtedly have finished it within the specified
time. A rival company, called the Omaha Company (the
defendant), was desirous of securing the grant for itself and
by outrageous frauds compassed its designs by inducing the
Legislature to pass an Act before the time allowed the Portgage Company had expired revoking the grant to that company and bestowing it upon the Omaha Company. The result
of their efforts was that Angle's work was arrested, his
material seized by the creditors who were 'supplying them,
his laborers scattered and all profit which he would have
received was lost to him. H
He thereupon sued the PortgageCompany in an action at law and obtained judgment, and
upon execution being returned nulzla bona, he filed his bill in
equity to reach the land in question in the Omaha Company's.
hands. The defendant filed a demurrer to the bill, the effect
of which was to admit the fraud and conspiracy charged, i. e.,
that the officers of the Portgage Company had been bribed
by the Omaha Company to betray their irust by placing the
entire outstanding' stock of the former under the control of the
latter, and that the Legislature had been induced by false allegations as to the progress of the work to revoke the grant to
the Portgage Company and to bestow it upon the Omaha
Company. The defendant relied upon the Act of the Legislature as a bar to subjecting this land which had been given
to them to the debts of the company from which it had been
taken away. The argument was that to allow the plaintiff to
recover was to impeach the validity of the Act contrary to
the establighed rule that whenever an Act of the Legislature
is challenged in court the inquiry is limited to the question of
power, and does not ektend to the matter of expediency or
the motives of the legislators, or the reasons which were
spread before them to induce the passage of the Act, a rule
which rests upon the principle of the independence of the
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Legislature as one of the co-ordinate departments of the
government. (Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87.) The reply
of the court to -this was that the wrongdoing of the Omaha
Company preceded the Act and that a remedy for that wrong
once in existence could not be destroyed. unless the Legislature had the power either to condone the wrongs or acting
in a' judicial capacity to decide that these wrongs gare no
cause of action. Such power, of course, could not be claimed.
The defendant also raised the objection that in an action at
law the defendant might obtain satisfaction for his injuries.
To this the court answered that under the circumstances the
remedy at law was not adequate, and they went even deeper
into the principles involved. "1Waiving the question as to
the solvency of the Omaha Company and assuming that any
judgment against it could be fully satisfied by legal process
then remains a proposition that it is contrary to equity that
,the defendant should be permitted to. enjoy unmolested that
particular property, the possession of which it sought to
secure by wrongful acts, and further, as these lands were
-given to aid in the construction of this road thd defendant
became a trustee ex-nalifcio in regard to them, and the plaintiff could pursue them into its hands since in good conscience
he is entitled to them to the extent of the payment for his
work of which the defendant unjustly deprived him by its
method of obtaining the property.
Mr. Justice HARLAN dissented on the ground that Angle
should have kept on with his work for it was not clear that
his injury was the direct result of the defendant's acts, "the
attempted revocation by the Legislature end. the loss by the,
company of credit in financial circles do iot in law hold the
relation of cause and effect." Further, he agreed with the
counsel for the defence that to allow the plaintiff to succeed
was to impeach the Act of the Legislature, for upon the
principle of the adjudged cases all intrinsic evidence in regard
to statutes must be excluded and the court must presume that
the Legislature was in possession of every fact affecting justice
-of such legislation.
It would seem, however, that the opinion of the majority is
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sound and that, though affected indirectly, the Act of the
Legislature was in fact independent of the case. The wrong
was done, the right to have it remedied arose and the defendant ought not to be allowed to use the Legislatue as a shield
for his wrong nor to insist that it could take away the plaintiff's remedy here any more than it could deprive him of any
of his other property without compensation. Moreover, there
was nothing in the case to indicate that the Legislature had
given the land to the Omaha Company other than freely and
with no restrictions exempting it from the usual incidents of
liability for its possessor's wrongdoing. On well defined
equitable principles the defendant was plainly a trustee and
answerable in a court of equity for the wrongs he had done.
R. P. BRADFORD.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

The police power-Presevationof game andfish.
A Statute of New York (Laws of N. Y., I88o, Chap. 591,
as amended by Laws of 1883, Chap. 317), prohibits the taking
of fish in certain waters within the jurisdiction of that state
otherwise than by "hook and line or rod held in hand,"
declares "any net, pound, etc.," a public nuisance, empowers
any person, and imposes upon the game and fish wardens the
duty to abate and summarily destroy such nefarious devices.
In Lawton et al. v. Steele (14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499), the constitutionality of this Act has been contested before the Supreme
Court, and Justice BROWN delivered its opinion upholding the
Act, Chief Justice FULLER and Justices FIET-D and BREWER
dissenting.
Of course, the validity of such a law as this rests upon that
oftimes conveniently indefinite and elastic power of the state,
the police power, applying as it has beeh held to do.to circumstances so various that they include the compulsory vaccination
of children and the suppression of obscene literature. It must
be confessed that the application of the police power to some
of the decided cases is of somewhat doubtful propriety.
The preservation of game and fish, however, seems and has

320

NOTES AND

COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS.

frequently been held, a distinctly proper subject for its exercise,
especially when it is remembered that uniform national game
laws are out of the question on account of the widely varying
conditions in different parts of the country.
So much for the general classification of the legislation.
The object of the law being of acknowledged wisdom and
validity, are the means directed for enforcing it proper and
constitutional?
The objection upon which the plaintiffs mainly relied was
that the statute deprived them bf their property without due
process of law. They were fishermen whose nets had been
found set (in violation of the Act) and promptly dqstroyed by
the defendant, a game and fish protector. The court found
that "the only real difficulty connected with the Act was the
right it gave to summari , destroy" the confiscated nets, and
met and overcame this difficulty by recognizing the eminently
practical mode of preventing such a nefarious practice that such
destruction presented, which, taken together with the fact that
the articles destroyed were of comparatively slight value, distinguished the case from those which hold judicial proceedings
necessary before condemnation.
Undoubtedly a rigid application to the facts of this case of
the general principle, that property cannot be taken and destroyed without due process of law, if by the latter is meant
judicial proceedings, must result in the conclusion that the Act
is unconstitutional. But where the general purpose sought to
be accomplished by the law is one preeminently popular with
all classes of law abiding citizens, and the only persons against
whom its provisions operate are those who stand practically.
outlawed, it would be pointless and absurd to throw about the
latter the protection afforded by a general principle. Of course,
the comparatively'slight value of the property taken, considered
alone, should not exempt it from a rule which applies to property of greater value, but it is at least to be'regarded as an
element in forming a conclusion as to the best and most effective
means of carrying the law into effect. The occupation of the
poacher is one that is very difficult to put a stop to. The only
thorough means of accomplishing this would seem to be to
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destroy the means by which it.is carried on. If it were
necessary to go through a judicial process of condemnation,
it is not likely that the purpose of the law would be veryeffectually accomplished.
The decision seems to us a fortunate departure from a:
general principle, and throws new light on the general subject
W. S. E.
of "due process."
Tk quo warrantoproceedingin the New Jersey Senate contest.
The recent contest for the New Jersey Senate which culminated in an action of quo warranto to determine in whom
vested the title to the presidency of that body is of general
political rather than general legal interest. A large part of
the case, also, depended upon the interpretation and construction of certain clauses of the State Constitution. The preliminary question of jurisdiction, however, interposed by counsel
for Mr. Rogers, was considered at some length by the Chief
Justice in his opinion. (Att'y-General ex rel. Werts v. Rogers.
et al., 28 Atlantic, 726.)
The state of facts presented to the court (withou't considering the political causes which produced them) was briefly, as
follows: Twenty-one Senators of the State had divided themselves into two bodies. Nine of the old members, with one
newly-elected member, who subsequently joined them, formed
themselves into what was known as the "Adrain" Senate,
while four of the old members, with seven newly-elected,
The former had been
comprised the, "Rogers" Senate.
recognized officially by the Governor, and at the time of the
action remained in session. The "Rogers" Senate was recognized officially by the lower House, but not by the Executive, but it had passed various measures and had appointed
certain State officers with the co6peration of tle House of
Assembly.
The applicants for the writ (the "Adrain" Senate) contended
that the "Rogers" Senate had no legal existence inasmuch as.
it was organized in a manner contrary to the fundamental law
of the State and the Constitution, "and, said the court, the
proposition, therefore, would seem very evident that, as no
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power is vested by the Constitution in this majority of Senators to construe such law in this respect, the power to expound
and enforce it is .odged in the ordinary legal tribunals." (See
Cooley, -Constitutional Limitations, 46.) The counsel for the
"Rogers" Senate, however, surprised the court by assuming
the position that the interpretation of the Constitution "being
a matter 6f purely legislative character," the court could not
,enteirtain jurisdiction of the case.
In reply to this the court said: "It is believed that no
-decision has been made for a century past that'does not
antagonize such a proposition."
The doubt expressed as to the court's jurisdiction certainly
seems to have had no foundation whatever. The question
was not whether the senatorial body had been organized in the
accustomed mode or contrary to the custom prescribed by its
own rules. Had that been the case it would have been proper
.for the settlement of the matter to have been arrived at by the
senate itself without recourse to the courts. The court
simply found itself called upon to determine whether or not
the Constitution had been violated by the legislature and it has
jurisdiction over such :a question is clear.
The other points of the case fall, as we have said, within
the particular provision of the New Jersey Constitution, and,
although interesting in their bearing on the general subject
present no doctrine of importance.
To readers of the daily newspapers the events which finally
led to the application to the court are still fresh. The general
,concurrent~e and approval of the judgment 'that have been
expressed form another instance of the willingness of the
people of all parties to accept cheerfullr a judicial decision,
no matter how bitter may have been the contest.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF THE HOUSE RULES.

There has been introduced into the House of Representatives at Washington a resolution amending Clause I of Rule
vni, of the Rules of the House. It has for its object the
securing of a quorum on a yea and nay vote of the House
when there is a quorum present. As is well known, for a
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long time it has beei, the custom of the members of the
minority desiring'to block legislation, to refuse to vote on a
call of the House, and thereby prevent the quorum of the
members which is necessary to pass any measure. Mr. Reed,
when he was Speaker, nullified this filibustering proceeding
by counting as present, to aid in making the quorum not only
those members who voted, but those who were present and
refused to vote. The -constitutionality of this proceeding was
doubted, but all doubts relative thereto were set aside by the
decision oftheSupreme Court in the case of the United States v.
Ballin, 144 U. S. I. Mr. Justice BREWER,in his opiion in that
case, said (p. 6): "The Constitution has prescribed no method of
making this determination, and it is therefore within the
competency of the House to prescribe any method which
shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact, It may prescribe answer to roll-call as the only method of determination;
or require the passage of members between tellers and their
count as the sole test, or the count of the Speaker or the
Clerk, and an -announcement from the desk of the names of
those who are present. Any one of these methods, it must
be conceded, is reasonably certain of ascertaining the fact,
and as there is no constitutional method prescribed, and no
constitutional inhibition of any of those, and no violation of
fundamental rights in any, it follows that the House may
adopt either or all, or it may provide for a combination of any
two of the methods. That was done by the rule in question,
and all that that rule attempts to do is to prescribe a 'method
for ascertaining the presence of a majority, and thus establishing the fact that the House is in a condition to transact business."
"As appears from the journal, at the time this bill passed
the House there was present a majority, a quorum, and the
House was authorized to transact any and all business. It
was in a condition to act on the bill if it desired. The other
branch of the question is, whether, a quorum being present,
the bill received a sufficient 'number of votes, and here the
general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum
is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of
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the body. This has been the rule for all time, except so far
as in any given case the terms of the organic act under which
the body is assembled have prescribed specific limitations.
As, for instance, in those states where the Constitution provides that a majority of all the members, elected to either
House Shall be necessary for the passage of any bill. No such
found in the Federal Constitution, and therefore
limitation isthe general law of such bodies obtains."
The principle on which this decision rests is that the Constitution requireg, and only requires the presence in the House
of a majority of the members legally elected thereto in order
that the House may transact business.
Any rule for ascertaining this fact-the presence of a
majority of elected members-which is reasonably sure in
practice of coming to a correct conclusion is constitutional.
Once the fact of a quorum being present is-ascertained, then
anything which the majority of these members there present
determine to do, the body, as an organization, does. The
theory that, irkorder to pass a bill or do any other act as a
representative body, a majority of the whole number of
elected persons must unite inactively desiring the thing to be
done; the theory, in other words, which required the majority
party, which is responsible for legislation, to constantly keep
a quorum of its own members in the House,'however, it may
be defended in the realm of politics or statesmanship, is entirely
untenable in the realm of constitutional law.
The difficulty of obtaining a quorum in the present House
of Representatives (without counting the quorum) after the
manner of the last Congress above desciibed, has been, we
understand, very great. This, we presume, is the reason of
the introduction into the House and the probable passage
of the resolution above referred to, which, besides from its
political aspect, raises a very nice question of constitutional law.
The first and second sections of the resolution are as follol;s:
"I.Every member shall be present within the House during
its sittings, unless excused or necessarily prevented, and shall
vote on each question put unless he has a direct personal or
pecuniary interest in the event of such question.
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Whenever in pursuance of § 5, Art. I of the Constitution
of the United States, the House of Representatives at the
request of one-fifth of the members present shall order the
yeas and nays of its members on any question to be entered
on its journal, and upon a call of the roll of its members for
that purpose a quorum thereof shall fail to vote, each member within the hall of the House who shall fail to vote when
his name is called, unless he has a direct personal or
pecuniary interest in the event of such question, and each
member who shall be absent from the hall of the House when
his name is called, unless he has been excused, or is necessarily prevented from being present, shall be fined the sum of
$io, and the Speaker shall cause an entry of such fine to be
made against such member on the journal of the House, and
the same shall be collected and paid into the Treasury of the
United States."
Now, there can be no doubt that the House can provide
rules for its own guidance and for the regulation of the conduct of its members. So far then, as the intended rule fines
a member for being absent, there can be no constitutional
objection -to it; but, on the other hand, it is equally certain
that each member of the House has a constitutional right to his
vote on every question before the House, and that a resolution
prohibiting any member from voting, or force any member to
vote in a way different from that which they desired .vould
violate, not only their own constitutional rights as representatives, but the constitutional rights of their constituency..
The question which is presented by the rule is this: has a
member the constitutional right, being present, to abstain
from voting? It might be argued that he has, for the reason
that the passive act of abstaining from voting may more nearly
obtain the desire of the representative in relation to the matter
in dispute before'the house. It may be, for instance, a perfectly
logical position for one who desires the ultimate success of a
measure, but thinks its consideration should be postponed until
other and more pressing business was disposed of, to take this
position: "If I vote against the measure, or for its postponement, I shall have, by increasing the majority for its postpone-
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ment or rejection, a tendency to defeat the ultimate passage
of this measure in which I am really interested. If I vote
for either measure, on the other hand, I accomplish its immediate passage or consideration which will postpone other and
more pressing business." In other wdrds, it might be
that, -in relation to a question before a legislative body, a
member thereof was not placed between the alternative of
voting for or against the measure, but that he had three
choices: to vote for it, to vote against it, or not to vote at all.
If we are right in this, the curtailunent and practical prohibition
against exercising one of these choices, is unconstitutional.
Since writing- the above, we understand that the proposed
rule, whose constitutionality is here involved in a certain
amount of doubt, has been withdrawn, and the Reed Rule
substituted in its place. There seems to us to be no reason
to doubt the wisdom of this course. As a political question,
it may be proper that the majority should be refuired, to keep
a quorum present, they being responsible for legislation, but
this principle is abandoned, as -well by fining a person present
ten dollars for not voting as by "counting the quorum."
Around the latter method there can gather no constitutional
doubts. The case we have here set out in full sets them at
rest forever. But the constitutionality of the rule proposed is
involved in a great deal of doubt. To fine a man ten dollars
for not voting when he is present is practically to force him to,
vote "Yea" or "Nay" on the call of the House.
PROPERTY.

Eminent domain-Consequentialdamages.
The case of Butchers' Ice and Coal Co. v. Philadelphia,
156 Pa. 54, contains an important statement of the liability
of a municipality for consequential damages to property under
Art. xvi, § 8, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. The
plaintiff owned a wharf extending into the river, ajid the
adjoining wharf owned by the city extended over one hundred feet farther into the stream than that of the plaintiff,
between was a dock sixty feet wide into which the city opened

NOTES AND

COMMENTS

ON RECENT DECISIONS.

a sewer at a point on the inner side of the dock forty-seven
feet from the plaintiff's wharf. It was in evidence that
deposits from the sewer obstructed the dock, and that injury
could have been avoided by the extension of the sewer to the
end of the city's wharf. It was held that the city was liable
for consequential damages and the liability was not affected
the fact the sewer was on the city's land nor was essential
that the land on which the sewer was constructed should
have been taken by the city by right of eminent domain. The
decision therefore did not turn upon the rule that the public
right of navigation is paramount to the right of sewerage
(Franklin Wharf Co. v. Portland, 67 Me. 46; S. C., 24 Amer.
Rep. I and note), but simply upon the application of the
familiar words, "taken, injured or destroyed," and therefore
the case of Malone v. The City, 2 Pennypacker, 370, prior
to the Constitution of 1874, could be distinguished. Another
difference pointed out was that in Malone v. The City, "the
sewer was built in obedience to a legislative mandate," while
in the case in question the sewer was constructed by authority
of an ordinance of councils under the Act of April 8, 1864Aside, however, from these distinctions the decision indicates
an intention to take a broader view of the clause of the Constitution in question and will no doubt lead to efforts to extend
its reasoning to other and different kinds of damage resulting
from municipal improvements.
Covenants running witt land.
City real property owners in general and those engaged in
the undertaking business in particular will be interested in the
decision in Rowland v. Miller, in the New York Court of
Appeals, 34 N. E. 765, affirming 18 N. Y-. Supp. 793. The
owner of lots in the residence part of the City of New York
sold some of them under a covenant running with the land
prohibiting their use for several purposes and concluding "nor
shall any other buildings be erected, or trade, or business carried on upon said lots which shall be injurious or offensive to
the neighboring inhabitants." Both parties occupied houses
built on these lots, and an injunction was sought by the com-
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,plainant to restrain the defendant lessee of the house next
door from carrying on the business of an undertaker upon the
premises.
"The' parties," said the court, "had in mind
ordinary normal people and meant to prohibit trades and
business which would be offensive to people. generally and
-wouldthus render the neighborhood to such people undesirable as a place of residence." It could not be doubted that
the business of undertaking was within this definition. "Judges,"
said the court, "must be supposed to be acquainted with the
ordinary sentiments, feelings and sensibilities of the people
among whom they live," and hence, after the character of the
business -had been proved, the court "could have found as a
matter of law that it was in violation of the restriction agreement." The contention, therefore, that the general clause in
the covenant extended only to trades and kinds of business
which are niisances per se, could not be sastained. In view
of the decision the decree is also interesting. It was ordered
that the premises should not be used for holding autopsies,
receiving, storing bodies, or holding funerals, but could be
used to solicit orders and sell coffins by sample and the room

called a "chapel" for a place of worship.

